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RESTRICTING IHOME VISITS: TOWARD MAKING
THE LIFE OF THE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

RECIPIENT LESS PUBLIC
DOUGLAS Q. WICKHAM t
Most of the recent constitutional litigation challenging offensive
practices in the administration of public assistance programs has been
based on notions of due process and equal protection of the laws.
Courts have struck down the substitute father rule ' and local residency
requirements.2 Within the last year, litigants have succeeded in establishing a constitutional right to a fair hearing prior to termination of
welfare payments 3 and have unsuccessfully asserted the illegality of
maximum limits on amounts to be given to family units regardless of
size.4 All of these cases represent attempts to purge the administration
of public assistance programs of practices generally regarded as abuses
of the welfare system because they deny benefits to otherwise eligible
persons for unconstitutional reasons. 5
This fall, the United States Supreme Court will hear arguments
in another such case, James v. Goldberg.' The controversy arosewvhen
Mrs. James, a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), refused to permit a New York City Social Service Departt A.B. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Yale University. Member, Illinois Bar.
The author wishes to acknowledge the encouragement of Barbara Ann Pope
and David P. Beverley of the University of South Carolina Graduate School of
Social Work faculty.
1King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
The Alabama regulation involved in
this case provided that any male who "cohabitated" with the mother of a family
otherwise eligible for AFDC payments be considered a "substitute father," thus disqualifying the family, because 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964) requires that one parent be
continually absent from the family. In invalidating the regulation, the Supreme
Court did not reach the equal protection argument advanced by the plaintiffs because
it found that for Alabama's definition of "parent" to include a substitute father with no
legal support duty was inconsistent with Congress' use of the word in § 406(a) of
the Social Security Act. 392 U.S. at 329-34.
2 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (equal protection).
3 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
(due process); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (due process).
4 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding maximum limits on
family grants not a violation of the equal protection clause).
5
See, e.g., Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and
Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv." 567 (1966); Reich, Individual
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965);
Wickham, Public Welfare Administration: Quest for a Workable Solution, 58 GEo.
L.J. 46 (1969).
6303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), prob. juris. ioted stb nora. Wyman v.
James, 397 U.S. 904 (1970).
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ment caseworker 7 to enter her home for a scheduled, daytime "home
visit." ' The caseworker sought to comply with New York State
regulations 9 requiring caseworkers periodically to interview public
assistance recipients in their homes. Following Mrs. James' refusal to
grant entry and a prior hearing on the issue of termination, the Department discontinued her AFDC payments. She then brought a class
action to enjoin the Department from terminating welfare payments
on the ground that termination for failure to allow a warrantless home
visit violated her right to privacy and her fourth amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches. Without reaching the privacy
issue, the three-judge federal court held two to one that New York
could not constitutionally condition public assistance payments on the
recipient's willingness to relinquish her fourth amendment right."° An
injunction forbidding the state from continuing this practice issued, and
Mrs. James was reinstated as an AFDC recipient.
Because the district court did not decide whether the home visit
violated Mrs. James' right to privacy, the holding in James v. Goldberg
7 The term "caseworker" is used herein to denote any agent of a public assistance
organization who is responsible for direct contact with and supervision of individual
welfare recipients. Many of the people encompassed by this broad definition of "caseworker" are not, however, formally trained as social workers. The Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare estimates that an effective public assistance program
would require that / of the social workers complete graduate training, but in 1964
only 4.8% had achieved this level of training. See DEPART1MENT OF HEW, TASK
FORCE ON SOCIAL WORK EDUCATION AND MANPOWER, CLOSING THE GAP" .

.

. IN

SOCIAL WORK MANPOWER 22-24 (1965). In addition, casework is only one of several
recognized methods of social work including group work and community organization, and is losing popularity because of its inadequacies. See Briar, The Casework
Predicament, 13 SociAL WORK, Jan. 1968, at 5. Consequently, all public assistance
workers may not be caseworkers as that term is ordinarily used.
The term "caseworker" is nevertheless used broadly herein on the assumption
that: (1) Public welfare agencies employ their line personnel as if they were all
formally trained caseworkers whatever their actual training. Some agencies attempt
to compensate for the lack of graduate-level schooling by providing in-service training. Regardless of the quality of his preparation, each worker is responsible for
helping his "clients" overcome their social problems. (2) Whatever the method of
social work utilized in a particular program, the welfare agency will always be
inquisitive and the privacy of the recipient will fare no better until the basic reforms
suggested herein are implemented.
S This practice is not comparable to the "midnight search" held unconstitutional
in Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967). In that case the searches, labelled "Operation Bedcheck," occurred during
the early morning hours, and the recipient subjected to the visit received no advance
warning. Id. at 26, 425 P2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 62. See also Reich, Midnight
Mrs.
Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
James' caseworker, on the other hand, had notified her by mail one week in advance
of the proposed visit to be scheduled at her convenience during business hours. 303
F. Supp. at 938.
Although Mrs. James refused to meet with the caseworker in her home, she
volunteered to "supply any information reasonable and relevant to her continued
receipt of public assistance . .
. at the offices of the Department." Id.
9 N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 134 (McKinney 1966); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 351.10,
351.21 (1962).

10 303 F. Supp. at 945.
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does not depart from the mainstream of recent welfare litigation. The
fourth amendment issue on which the decision turned had not been
raised in earlier cases, but the result merely places one more procedural
restriction on the administration of federally supported public assistance
programs." A recipient may now insist, without risking termination
of public assistance, that a caseworker obtain a search warrant from a
magistrate before entering her home.
Mrs. James' right to privacy argument appears to be directed at
violations of her right occurring after the caseworker entered her
home.' She alleged that "questions concerning personal relationships,
beliefs and behavior are raised and pressed which are unnecessary for
a determination of continuing eligibility." '" Forcing caseworkers to
procure search warrants prior to conducting home visits fails to meet
this objection, however, if the caseworker's discretion alone governs the
conduct of the visit after he enters the home. 4 Only a right of privacy
firmly rooted in the law can afford the desired protection.
This direct confrontation between the recipient's right to privacy
and mandatory home visits, a practice long considered essential to the
effective administration of public assistance programs,25 may impart a
new direction to welfare litigation. By threatening to make unavailable
the requisite personal information, it directly challenges the system's
attempt to govern the behavior and morality of recipients through restrictive eligibility requirements.
This Article will explore the recipient's interest in maintaining a
zone of privacy, examine the legal protection currently afforded this
privacy, and suggest ways in which the administration of public assistance programs can and should be reoriented to respect fully the privacy
of the recipient.
11
The Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §301 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1969), presently authorizes federal support for four categorical state public assistance programs: (1) Old Age Assistance (OAA), id. §§301-06; (2) Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), id. §§601-09; (3) Aid to the Blind,
id. §§ 1201-06; and (4) Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), id.
§§ 1351-55. Attention has been focused primarily on invasions of privacy in the
AFDC program, but because eligibility questions necessitating home visits to obtain
information often arise in each of the other programs, Janes is also relevant to them.
12 Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction at 13-18, James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (relying on Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
i Complaint at 6, James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
' 4 See K. DAvis, DisCRETIoNARY JUSTICE 180-88 (1969).
The caseworker's
discretion arises from his initial power over the public assistance recipient's income.
Control of this discretion, whether by a new legal principle or administrative changes
(or both), must be the central object of any serious attempt to reform public assistance administration.
15 See, e.g., Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation and the Welfare Home Visit,
79 YALE L.J. 746 (1970).
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I. PRIVACY AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY

In recent years many commentators have expressed concern over
the diminishing scope of personal privacy in the United States. The
demise of privacy is often attributed to the "information explosion" and
to the increased utilization of computers capable of assimilating vast
quantities of personal information.' Fewer voices, however, have been
raised on behalf of the privacy of the public assistance recipient, although invasions of his privacy predate the computer age.' 7
Many conceive of privacy in terms of particular intrusions from
But a more positive and
which the individual has a right to be free.'
inclusive statement of the essence of privacy and its importance to
every individual is needed to avoid undervaluing the recipient's privacy
when weighing it against the administrative needs of public assistance
programs.
Professor Charles Fried has demonstrated that privacy is more
than a simple right to be left alone.' 9
As a first approximation, privacy seems to be related to
secrecy, to limiting the knowledge of others about oneself.
This notion must be refined. It is not true, for instance, that
the less that is known about us the more privacy we have.
Privacy is not simply an absence of information about us in
the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over
information about ourselves.2 0
16Proposals for a completely computerized and centralized individual data bank
have been offered. The reader might contemplate how complete a picture of himself
could be constructed simply by combining his scholastic, military, taxation, credit,
and employment records (to name only the most readily available sources of information). Retention of privacy should be a universal concern. See Karst, "The
Files": Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored PersonalData,
31 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 342 (1966); Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer
Age: The Challenge of New Technology in an Informnation-Oriented Society, 67
Micir. L. REv. 1091, 1128-56 (1969).
17
See Handler & Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Tuvenile
Justice, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROR. 377 (1966); Reich, supra note 5.
1 The origin of the concept of a legal right to privacy is considered to lie in
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAav. L. Rxv. 193 (1890). A more
recent exposition of this concept of the right and its legal foundation may be found
in Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960).
19
Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968).
201d. 482. For similar analyses of the legal concept of privacy, see Beaney,
The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 253 (1966);
Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLm. L. REv. 1184,
1188-90 (1965). Professor Beaney defines the right to privacy as
the legally recognized freedom or power of an individual (group, association,
class) to determine the extent to which another individual (group, class,
asssociation, or government) may (a) obtain or make use of his ideas, writings, name, likeness, or other indicia of identity, or (b) obtain or reveal
information about him or those for -whom he is personally responsible, or
(c) intrude physically or in more subtle ways into his life space and his
chosen activities.
Beaney, supra at 254.
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Privacy permits the individual to control the manner in which he
relates to other human beings. Without the ability to preserve his
privacy, an individual could not enter into the relationships of love,
friendship, and trust so essential to our concept of human dignity.
"To be deprived of this control not only over what we do but over who
we are [in the eyes of others] is the ultimate assault on liberty, personality, and self-respect." 21
In the typical home visit by a welfare caseworker, the most obvious
invasions of the recipient's privacy arise from the administration of the
means test to determine initial and continuing eligibility.' In applying
this test, the welfare department reviews the recipient's financial status,
thoroughly investigates her background for other resources from which
she could derive support, and periodically rechecks her case to determine whether she is spending the grant properly and whether her need
level has changed. In New York, for instance, the statute requires an
investigator reviewing an application for assistance to seek information
as to the residence of such person, the name, age, religious
faith, physical condition, earnings or other income, and ability
to work of all members of the family, the cause of the person's
condition, the ability and willingness of the family, relatives,
friends and church to assist, and such other facts as may be
useful in determining the treatment which will be helpful to
such person.2
This constant surveillance and questioning forces the public assistance
recipient to choose between retaining control over what is known about
her most personal affairs or relinquishing that control to qualify for
the economic assistance needed to provide her family with the essentials
of life.
The AFDC program permits greater intrusions into the personal
lives of recipients than the other assistance programs because each state
determines whether AFDC children are being suitably housed and cared
for. State and local authorities generally have discretion to define
"suitability," I and often condition the AFDC grant upon recipient
compliance with an arbitrarily imposed standard of morality. 5 HEW's
21

Fried, supra note 19, at 485.
22 The perfidious effect of the means test is well-documented. E.g., Bendich,
Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAIJF. L. REv. 407 (1966); Handler,
Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 479
(1966); Reich, supra note 8; Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 1307 (1967).
,23.N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW § 132 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
24 W. BELL, Am To DEPENDENT CHILDREN 29 (1965j.,
2See Handler & Rosenheim, spra note 17; tenBiroek, California's Dual System
of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REv. 614
(1965).
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Flemming Ruling requiring the states to continue aid to the family
unless the children are relocated from the unsuitable home may limit the
impact of this discretionary power,2" but arbitrary intrusions into recipients' lives will persist until the vague eligibility requirements are
altered.
Neither the complaint nor the opinion in James v. Goldberg spells
out the kind of questioning to which the plaintiff objected, but one can
safely surmise several of the likeliest lines of inquiry. Despite the
Supreme Court's decision in King v. Smith,27 a man in the house remains a frequent source of concern to public assistance agencies vigilant
in their search for alternative sources of support for the needy family.2
The demand for the names and addresses of all relatives also leads to
invasions of privacy when the agency proceeds to track down the
relatives and dun them for support.2 9 For any number of valid reasons,
a young mother applying for AFDC benefits might wish to conceal her
predicament from her parents and other relatives. Conversely, the
relatives have a strong interest in avoiding the scrutiny of the welfare
agency, particularly if their relationship with the applicant is attenuated
and their incomes meager. Under present requirements, however, the
recipient must sacrifice control over her relationship with her relatives
and risk subjecting them to bothersome inquiries before she can
qualify for aid.
The most recent public role forced on public assistance recipients
is that of "research object." Research sometimes passes as justification
for caseworker interrogation, but the questions concerning family status
and marital partners are no less personal as a result.8 0 More important, the potential uses of the information obtained remain the same.
Less obvious are those invasions of privacy wrought under the
social service amendments to the Social Security Act. The Act was
amended first in 1956 31 to encourage the states to offer social services
26 HEW issued this ruling after Louisiana removed a majority of the black public
assistance recipients from its roles by declaring unsuitable any home in which a parent
was responsible for an illegitimate child. See W. BELL, supra note 24, at 138-48.

27392 U.S. 309 (1968).
28 The most recent round of litigation on this subject concerns state regulations
creating "presumptions of support" from a man assuming the role of a spouse
(MARS) as defined by the regulation. E.g., Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970);
Grubb v. Sterrett, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 1111,533 (N.D. Ind., May 7, 1970).
29See Bell, Relatives' Responsibility: A Problem in Social Policy, 12 SocIAL

WoRK, Jan. 1967, at 32. Bell argues persuasively that this burden of support falls
on those who can least afford it, id. 37, destroys family cohesion, id. 38-39, and
conserves public funds primarily-by deterring applicants from applying, id. 39.

3o See Ruebhausen & Brim, supra note 20, at 1203.
31 Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No. 880, §312, 70 Stat. 848 (1956), amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-03 (1964).
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by providing federal aid, and then in 1962 ' to require the states to
integrate social services into their public assistance programs. The
1956 amendment to the AFDC portion of the Act evidenced a congressional intent to make acceptance of social services (prescribed by
3
the caseworker) a condition for receiving the basic economic grant.
But by conditioning the grant of economic subsistence on the acceptance
of social services such as instruction on house keeping, raising children,
budgeting the grant, or conducting one's social life, the administrators
of public assistance deprive the recipient of control over her existence.
Although these services may be offered with the best motives, the recipient cannot accept them voluntarily: by rejecting the offer she risks
losing the grant. 4
Admirable motives notwithstanding, treating the public assistance
recipient in this way contradicts the basic goals of the AFDC program:
[T]o help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence consistent
with the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection .

.

. .

The invasions of privacy cited above tend to transform recipients into
dependent citizens stripped of the critical ability to control the direction
and style of their lives." The public assistance recipient is thus in a
position analogous to Professor Fried's electronically monitored
parolee:" 7 the recipient has failed to maintain independent economic
status and must pay the price of continual supervision in exchange for
a subsistence allowance. Relationships of trust are consequently foreclosed because "[t]he negation of trust is constant surveillance .
which minimizes the possibility of undetected default. The [recipient]
is denied the sense of self-respect inherent in being trusted by the
2 Act of July 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104, 76 Stat. 185 (1962), amending
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-05 (1964).
3
The New York City Department of Social Services contends that an AFDC
parent must accept services offered as a result of a home visit to remain eligible for
assistance. Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant Wyman at 17-18, Wyman v. James,
397 U.S. 904 (1970) (noting probable jurisdiction). See also McEntire & Haworth,
The Two Functioms of Public Welfare: Income Maintenance and Social Services, 12
SOCIAL WORK,Jan. 1967, at 22, 28.
4 Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12, at 21-23. See also Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (confession obtained by police threat to have welfare
benefits terminated held coerced). As long as the caseworker wields discretionary
power over the recipient's subsistence income, no rational recipient would refuse his
requests.
35 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964).
30 "[W]e deprive an individual of the one freedom that is primary to all others
and that endows him with the core of his dignity: the freedom to make a shambles
of his life." Miller, Value Dilemmais in Social Casework, 13 SocIAL WoRx, Jan.
1968, at 27, 30.
37
Fried, spra note 19, at 475-76.
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government which [provides aid]." s Thus deprived, the AFDC
mother cannot be expected to function as a full-fledged citizen. Nor can
her children, for they will not experience the privacy essential to the
development of mature human relationships.
To enjoy privacy, the public assistance recipient must control her
relationship with the caseworker and the program. She alone must
set the moral tone of her home, and departmental investigations of her
case should not unnecessarily disrupt her relationships with her friends
and family by broadcasting the facts of her economic plight.
Yet the recipient's privacy must be subjected to some restrictions
in the administration of public assistance programs. The legitimate
needs of the department and of recipient privacy require reconciliation
to the satisfaction of both. The remainder of this Article will examine
the legal basis for protecting the public assistance recipient's privacy
and then suggest how administrative needs and recipient privacy can
be reconciled under these guiding legal principles.
II.

PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION

Mrs. James presented two distinct legal theories in support of her
attack on warrantless home visits: that the state may not constitutionally compel the recipient to relinquish fourth amendment rights
as a condition to aid,"0 and that the constitutional right to privacy
itself limits the discretion of the caseworker once inside the home pursuant to a warrant.40 The court never reached the second claim,4"
although this line of argument contains the potentially more effective
legal guidelines for reconciling the administrative and recipient interests
in public assistance.
A. The Fourth Amendment as Protection
In deciding that the state cannot condition public assistance benefits
on the recipient's willingness to relinquish fourth amendment rights, the
James court examined several questions. First, finding that the fourth
and fourteenth amendments protect persons from unwarranted governmental intrusions whether or not the object of the intrusion is to
uncover and seize evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, the court
held that the home visit constitutes an unreasonable search.Y The
38 Id. 490-91.
39 The court accepted this argument. 303 F. Supp. at 945.
40
Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 12.
41
Although the court restricted its holding to the fourth amendment issue, it
recognized that one important function of the fourth amendment is to protect the
traditional sphere of privacy, the home, from unwarranted official intrusions. 303 F.

Supp. at 941, 946.
42 Id.at 944.
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court reasoned that "a search of a private dwelling without a warrant
or proper consent is presumptively 'unreasonable,' " 43 and that the
fourth amendment affords "basic protection for everyone," not just for
those accused of committing crimes." Second, because the home visit
involves a significant infringement of a fundamental right, the court
held that the government must demonstrate a compelling interest to
Third, although the defendant commisconduct warrantless visits.'
sioner of the New York City Department of Social Services failed to
produce evidence sufficient to justify creating a new exception to the
search warrant requirement, the court did acknowledge the special
circumstances embodied in the home visit by adopting a "relaxed
standard" for determining probable cause for the issuance of search
warrants to caseworkers.46
1. The Home Visit as a Search
The holding in James v. Goldberg follows logically from the purpose of the fourth amendment as articulated over the years by the
47
Supreme Court, and particularly from Camara v. Municipal Court
and See v. City of Seattle,4" cases in which the Court has applied the
fourth amendment to administrative inspections. The general policy
of the amendment is to protect the individual and his surroundings
from unauthorized intrusions by government officials." In Schmerber
v. California," the Supreme Court held that a blood test administered
in a hospital to a driver accused of drunken driving is a search under
the fourth amendment and stated that: "The overriding function of
the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State." " Thus, the James court
correctly assumed that "[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . governs all

intrusions by agents of the public upon personal privacy and security."

62

43 Id. at 940.
44
Id.at 941.

45 Id.
46 [I]t must be noted that the Court in Camara v. Municipal Court
emphasized that "a health official need [not] show the same kind of proof
to a magistrate to obtain a warrant as one must who would search for the
fruits or instrumentalities of crime." This would appear applicable to the
instant proceedings.
Id. at 944.
47 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
48 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
49 See LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 1967 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 20.
5 0384 U.S. 757 (1966).
5. Id.at 767 (emphasis added).
62 303 F. Supp. at 940 (emphasis added) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18
(1968)).
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The James court relied heavily on Canarav. Municipal Court,' in
which the defendant refused to permit a municipal inspector to enter his
house in San Francisco to conduct a routine inspection for violations of
the local housing code. The inspector returned twice without a warrant before charges were brought under a local statute purportedly
providing authority for warrantless inspections. The Court accepted
the defendant's allegation that the section of the local housing code
authorizing entry without a warrant and without probable cause
violated the fourth amendment. The Court noted that the practical
effect of forcing the defendant to risk criminal prosecution if he wished
to challenge the inspector's decision to search his home "is to leave the
occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is
precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search." ' In Canara'scompanion case, See v. City
of Seattle, the Court established the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of commercial property as well.5
The public assistance home visit can arguably be distinguished
from the administrative inspection cases because the purposes of and
the needs for the intrusions differ. The sole purpose of the inspector's
visit in Camara was to seek out intentional or inadvertent violations
of the local housing code. But a dual purpose lies behind the home
visit. The practice of visiting recipients' homes initially arose out of
the need to review eligibility."6 Because this purpose for the visit is
to discover any changes in the recipient's eligibility status," the caseworker conducting the home visit is an investigator. With the addition
of the service requirements to the federal program, the secondary function of the caseworker, the provision of social services, took on new
importance. Thus the second fundamental purpose of the home visit
is to establish a productive caseworker-client relationship through which
the former can encourage the latter's "social rehabilitation." r,
3387 U.S. 523 (1967). The James court also quoted extensively" from District
of Columbia v. Little, 178 F2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1
(1950), in which Judge Prettyman argued forcefully for this broad interpretation
of the term "search."
Z4 387 U.S. at 532-33.
6 387 U.S. at 545.
5
?6See W. BELL, supranote 24, at 3-13.
r7 See N.Y. Soc. SEviwcEs LAw § 134-a (McKinney Supp. 1969) ; 18 N.Y.C.R.R.
§§351.10, 351.21 (1962).
18
In 1962, the Social Security Act was amended to require states to include
social service programs in their annual AFDC proposals before approval could be
granted. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (14)

(Supp. IV, 1969).

But such plans apparently

have little effect on the recipients. The only major empirical study in this area
concluded that "very little social service activity goes "on." Handler & Hollings-

worth, Stigma. Privacy, and Other Attitudes of Welfare Recipients, 22

STAN.

L.
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Although a certain amount of ambiguity attends this combination
of functions, the home visit is usually more benevolent than a housing
code inspection. As the lone dissenter in James argued, the purpose
of the home visit "is to assist the children, not to catch the children's
mother in a violation of the law." " To concentrate on the benevolent
purpose of the home visit, however, would ignore the reality of the
investigative function leading, as it does, to the periodic reexamination
of eligibility.
The James court did not rely on such an analysis, but did take
judicial notice of provisions of the New York Social Services Law
effectively requiring caseworkers to report any evidence of welfare
fraud coming to their attention. Under the statute, which defines
welfare fraud to include fraudulent applications and failure to report
income not included in the original or subsequent eligibility reviews,
the caseworker "shall refer the facts and evidence available to him to
the appropriate . .

prosecuting official." 'o

Assuming that case-

workers in other states operate under similar regimens, the investigative function pervades all home visits."' If the caseworker came to
the recipient's home to discuss medical care, for instance, and saw in
the course of the visit luxury items of any sort, this information would
likely be used to initiate further investigation leading finally to prosecution. This possibility, the court found, "sustained" its decision to
classify home visits as searches. 62
Yet the definition of "search" set forth in the court's holding
encompasses a broader area than investigations leading to criminal
prosecution. In conjunction with its conclusion that the fourth amendment protects not only those suspected of committing crimes but also
the innocent from unwarranted governmental intrusions, the James
court stated:
To attempt to draw a distinction regarding the applicability
of the Amendment dependent upon whether the caseworker
intends to counsel the recipient as to how best to utilize his
limited resources or to look for evidence of fraud, would
invite a trial of every official's purpose-a task which would
undoubtedly pervert the intent of the Amendment. There
exists no valid reason for varying the protection afforded by
1, 10 (1969). The data may not adequately support this generalization, however,
because the statistical sample was drawn from two medium-sized cities and several
rural counties in Wisconsin. Also, the authors point out that "the Wisconsin
AFDC program is best characterized as one of minimal caseworker intervention and
regulation." Id. 8. A program of this nature could not support active social services.
59 303 F. Supp. at 946 (McLean, J., dissenting).

0 N.Y. Soc. SsvcEs LAw § 145 (McKinney Supp. 1969).
1 See Note, mnpra note 15.

0

62 303 F. Supp. at 944.
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the Amendment even assuming that the home visit is an
effort to deal with a purely "social problem." '3
In support of this conclusion, the court cited Verdugo v. United
States,'" a narcotics offense case in which the court held that illegally
seized evidence, suppressed at trial, could not be considered during the
sentencing process merely because sentencing is "an effort to deal with
a 'social problem.' " 65 The Verdugo court looked to the Camara decision for support for this statement.
In Camara, however, as in Verdugo, evidence produced by the
search would have been used in a criminal proceeding.6 6 In James,
the court noted the potential for a criminal proceeding but did not rely
on this possibility in labelling the visit a search. Thus, the breadth of
the court's holding forbids entry even if, at some future date, the
investigative function is eliminated or simply segregated from the
rehabilitative function. This holding emphasizes that the essence of
the evil prohibited by the fourth amendment is the unwarranted intrusion into the individual's home by any government official.
2. Permissibility of Warrantless Home Visits
If home visits are searches within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, then to permit a caseworker to enter an AFDC recipient's
home without her free consent 6' and without a search warrant requires
the creation of a new judicial exception to the general prohibition
against warrantless searches.68 None of the present narrowly drawn
exceptions to the search warrant requirement encompasses the normal
home visit. 9 Thus, unless a new exception is created, a public assist6

Id. at 942.

64402 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1968).
65 Id. at 611 n20.
66 387 U.S. at 531. The Court noted that, even if the violation did not lead to
a criminal charge, failure to comply would.
17 Because the caseworker wields great discretionary power over the recipient
subjected to the search, a court would be unlikely to find that her consent was ever
freely given. See Reich, vtpra note 8, at 1349. Therefore, this exception can be
ignored for the purpose of this discussion.
68 In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), the Supreme Court in effect
authorized such an exception when it upheld a state's conviction of a homeowner
for refusing to permit health inspectors to enter his home in the course of a search
for the source of a rat infestation. In Camara, the Court explicitly overruled Frank,
finding no public interest sufficient to justify an exception to the warrant requirement for administrative searches. 387 U.S. at 528.
89 In addition to the exception for searches to which valid consent is given,
warrantless searches are permitted when incident to lawful arrests, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); when a risk exists that the evidence of a crime
will be destroyed if the search is not conducted immediately, Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966) (sanctioning immediate blood test for drunken driving suspect) ;
and when the police are in "hot pursuit' of a suspected criminal, Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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ance home visit, now classified as a search, would be unreasonable if
conducted against the recipient's wishes without a warrant.
In considering the possibility that a new exception might be
warranted, the James court held that
when the conditions annexed to the enjoyment of these
benefits require a waiver of rights secured by the Constitution
the governmental entity seeking to impose those conditions
must show a compelling state interest therefore. No showing

merely of a rational relationship to some valid governmental
policy will suffice."°
By imposing this due process test, the court made the state's task of
71
justifying its practice almost impossible.
The New York City Department of Social Services attempted to
respond to Mrs. James' constitutional attack with familiar arguments
for forcing public assistance recipients to waive their rights in order
to remain eligible for benefits. Stressing the need to obtain reliable
information for the periodic eligibility reviews to prevent fraud, the
officials argued that all public assistance recipients must be subjected
to in-the-home inspections to protect the taxpayers' dollars.'
The
Department also argued that by seeking benefits under the AFDC
program, Mrs. James necessarily incurred an obligation to answer
relevant questions as a prerequisite to establishing her eligibility. 73
This obligation stems from the purpose of AFDC-to assure proper
parental care for needy children in their homes whenever possible.
Because of the importance placed on home conditions, they are an
essential element in every eligibility decision. For the Department to
make an informed assessment on this subject necessitates a first-hand
personal visit to the recipient's home by the caseworker. Finally, the
state officials averred that the home visit provides the only reliable conduit for disseminating social services.
The James court found these arguments inadequate, basing its
finding principally on the existence of alternative means of obtaining
TD

303 F. Supp. at 942.

71 The court felt a compelling interest particularly necessary when the state did
not attempt to achieve its end in the manner which least infringed upon the 'recipient's rights. Id. at 943.
The majority opinion in James cited five cases in support of the compelling
interest requirement. Id. at 942. All of these cases involve first amendment issues
either directly or indirectly through the fourteenth amendment limitation on state
activity. Following Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), in which the Court
held the constitutionally based right to travel fundamental, the fourth amendment
interests involved in James are arguably sufficiently fundamental to merit application
of the compelling interest standard.
72
3

Jurisdictional Statement, jiupra note 33, at 15.

7 Id.
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74
the information legitimately required for the eligibility determination.
Several other considerations also militate against a finding of a com-

pelling interest in this situation.

Shapiro v. Thompson 75 firmly re-

jected the "protect the public fisc" argument as a basis for impeding the
exercise of a "fundamental" constitutional right. Similarly, in Goldberg v. Kelly,7 the Supreme Court held that increased fiscal and administrative costs, including the cost of temporarily disbursing benefits
to ineligible persons, did not justify denying a hearing prior to terminating benefits. 77 Furthermore, the James court rightfully ignored
the argument that the visits are necessary to provide social services.

Many welfare recipients undoubtedly need social services, but to foster
a new exception to the search warrant requirement for this reason
alone is to assume that the agency always knows the needs of the
recipient better than she does herself and that the recipient should be
forced to accept the services whether or not she desires them. In light
of the court's rejection of these arguments, the public assistance agency
faces an impossible burden in attempting to show a compelling interest
in mandatory warrantless home visits.
3. Adequacy of the Protection
Assuming that James v. Goldberg will be affirmed on appeal, the
question remains whether the application of the fourth amendment to
home visits provides adequate protection for the recipient's interest in
maintaining the maximum possible personal privacy. The key to this
inquiry lies in the standard imposed by the court in issuing search
warrants.
In criminal cases search warrants issue only when probable cause
exists that specified items will be found on certain premises.7" To meet
this standard a public assistance caseworker would have to show to the
judge's satisfaction that a particular recipient was probably receiving
benefits illegally by concealing assets or income in the home, or that a
given family needed a particular service based on observations outside
74 The court suggested that the same information could be obtained by examining
leases, birth certificates, and school records, and by requiring the children to undergo
periodic medical examinations at public clinics. 303 F. Supp. at 943. The court
also noted a proposed change in the HEW regulations as supporting its conclusion.
For a discussion of the new regulations and further alternatives, see text accompanying notes 134-48 infra.
75 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
76 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
7
7 Id. at 265-66.
78
See LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law . . . Has Not
. . . Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L. F. 255, 259-77; Note, Testing the FactualBasis
for a Search Warrant,67 CoLUm. L. REv. 1529 (1967). Admittedly, the showing need
not be as exacting as the proof required at a criminal trial, but probable cause must
be particularized.
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the home. Admittedly, outside sources might provide this information
in some cases, but in the majority of instances an objective showing
sufficient to persuade a magistrate of the need for a search would be
difficult to make without previously entering the home.7"
Presented with a similar problem in the administrative inspection
cases, the Supreme Court o recognized that the traditional probable
cause standard might unduly obstruct efforts to further the legitimate
public interests in eliminating health and safety hazards through
enforcement of housing and fire codes. Consequently, the Court proposed and adopted a "relaxed standard" of probable cause to evaluate
these particular applications for search warrants."' By adopting this
"relaxed standard," 82 the majority in James reopened any doors that
the traditional search warrant requirement might have closed to
caseworkers.
The Camara opinion offers little guidance for determining what
specific showing would satisfy this new standard of probable cause.
After "determining reasonableness [of the search] by balancing the
need to search against the invasion which the search entails," 83 the
Court found the appropriate standard of probable cause in the legislative standards calling for the areawide housing code inspection.
Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program
being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house),
or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the
particular dwelling.'
The essence of the Camara standard of probable cause calls for a willingness on the part of the magistrate to accept more general evidence
as the basis for a warrant and to give weight to administrative decisions
79 A welfare department might permissibly rely on tips from informers to make
a showing of probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The "two-pronged" test for probable cause
set out in Aguilar requires: (1) demonstration of circumstances sufficient to enable a
magistrate to make an independent judgment of the validity of the informer's conclusion; and (2) support for the credibility of the informant. Id. at 114. The best
evidence for demonstrating probable cause would still likely be found in the recipient's
home, but after James, the caseworker will have to obtain his warrant without the
benefit of that information.
80 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) ; See v. City of Seattle, 387

U.S. 541 (1967).
81387 U.S. at 538.
82 303 F. Supp. at 944; see note 46 supra.

83 387 U.S. at 536-37.
84 Id. at 538.
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to make certain searches on policy grounds."' Applied to the public
assistance situation, this standard permits a caseworker to show probable cause by producing general evidence of a need to establish or reestablish eligibility, or evidence that recipients probably need the services ordinarily provided as a part of the home visit. The magistrate
must give weight to administrative findings that recipients similarly
situated to the reluctant recipient frequently need caseworker services.
For example, a warrant might be obtained by demonstrating that
enough time had elapsed so that the recipient's financial circumstances
had probably changed and therefore the grant must be recomputed.
Evidence that a particular recipient has a history of instability and requires monthly caseworker visits, but never seeks out his caseworker,
might justify a warrant in connection with the provision of social
services. In an area highly concentrated with public assistance recipients, the burden might be met by an administrative decision that
all persons need caseworker attention to prevent massive disturbances
in the area.
Under this relaxed standard of probable cause, public assistance
agencies will be able to accommodate the requirement imposed on them
by James v. Goldberg with only minimal adjustment of their procedures. One may safely predict that caseworkers seeking search warrants will generally be successful whenever a recipient proves reluctant
to grant the caseworker an appointment to visit the home. Once the
caseworker obtains the warrant, he enters the recipient's home with the
same uncontrolled discretion to invade her privacy. Because of the
breadth of the new criteria for issuing warrants under the relaxed
standard of probable cause and the vagueness of the present eligibility
standards, no matter how carefully the magistrate draws the warrant,
he will be unable to prevent the caseworker from extending the scope
of the search after entering the house. And in the majority of cases,
in which criminal prosecutions do not result, the exclusionary rule will
not operate to enforce the restrictions in the warrant. Thus the fourth
amendment search warrant provision should not be expected to protect
adequately the privacy of the public assistance recipient.
B. The Right of Privacy as Protection
Nowhere does the Bill of Rights specifically mention privacy; nor
does any direct judicial precedent authorize constitutional protection
for the right Mrs. James claimed should be hers. Yet in Griswold v.
Connecticut," the Supreme Court recognized, in hazy terms, a consti85 See LaFave, mtpra note 49, at 23-25.
86381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tutional right of privacy which can and should be applied to protect the
public assistance recipient's privacy.
In Griswold, the Court held that a Connecticut statute making
criminal the use of or the assistance in the use of birth control apparatus
violated the petitioners' right of privacy grounded in the "penumbras"
of the various amendments contained in the Bill of Rights. To reach
this issue the Court granted the petitioners-operators of a Planned
Parenthood birth control clinic in New Haven-standing to assert the
rights of the husband and wife actually employing the birth control
device. Although at least three theoretical bases for the right of
privacy can be discerned in the Griswold opinions,1 six of the Justices
unequivocally recognized a right of privacy of constitutional dimension.
Whether that right exists in the penumbras of the various amendments,88 among the "rights . . . retained by the people" under the

ninth amendment,89 or among the fundamental aspects of liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,"0 the
decision to strike down the Connecticut statute clearly rests on the
petitioners' right to marital privacy. An attempt to expand the scope
of Mrs. James' privacy vis-A-vis the public assistance agency might
simply refer to Griswold and assert that the case stands for the proposition that the government may not deprive individuals of control over
certain aspects of their lives. A look at recent judicial applications of
the Griswold principles in five different factual situations will add flesh
to the bareboned assertion that Mrs. James' privacy merits this constitutional protection.
Reliance on the Griswold principles has been most prevalent in a
series of state and lower federal court decisions dealing with suspensions of public school students for violations of hair length regulations
set by school officials. In each of these cases personal privacy claims
have been raised; the results have been mixed.
In Breen v. Kahl,9 the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a high
school student, expelled for failing to comply with the school hair
length standard, when the administration failed to present objective
proof of disruptions in the school's functions caused by the student's
87 See Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for an Expanded
Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 197 (1965); Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,
Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64
MICH. L. REv. 235 (1965); McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intmations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965). Some of the justices carefully labelled this
a right of marital privacy. E.g., 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
88381 U.S. at 484-85 (Douglas, J.).
89 Id. at 491-93 (Goldberg, 3., concurring).
90 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, 3., concurring).
91419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970).

1970]
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appearance 2 The court affirmed the existence of a constitutional right
to wear one's hair according to one's personal tastes, and noted that
this right could be grounded in Justice Douglas' penumbras or among
Justice Goldberg's unenumerated ninth amendment rights 3 In Ferrell
9
v. Dallas Independent School District,
" however, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the suspension of two students when the only proof of possible
disruption offered by the school authorities consisted of their opinions
that long hairstyles would lead to disturbances."' The court agreed
that hairstyle is a form of expression protected by the first amendment
but held that the school district had shown a compelling interest in
regulating the students.9 6
The majority view in this series of decisions seems to be that
personal grooming is either a fundamental mode of self-expression
protected by the first amendment or a matter of personal privacy
shielded by the Griswold result. In either case, the school district must
meet a substantial burden to justify its regulations. The minority view
does not consider personal grooming fundamental and places a lesser
9
burden of justification on the school officialsY.
Although the holding in Stanley v. Georgia"8 is not based on
Griswold, the Supreme Court reemphasized in its Stanley opinion the
primacy of the principles enunciated in Griswold.9
State officials
entered Stanley's home on the authority of a search warrant issued in
connection with an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities.
In the course of the search, the officials stumbled on three reels of film
which they confiscated as obscene material. In reversing Stanley's
conviction for possessing obscene movies, the Court ignored the failure
of the state court to suppress the illegally seized film and relied instead
92
Accord, Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970) (college
dress code); Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa
1970) (female student) ; Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969) ;
Griffin v Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Yoo v. Moynihan, 28 Conn.

Sup. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (Hartford County Ct. 1969).

93 419 F.2d at 1036.
94392 F2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).

Justice Douglas

dissented from the denial of certiorari, stating that: "It comes as a surprise that in
a country where the States are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a person

can be denied education in a public school because of the length of his hair."
U.S. at 856.
5

1 Accord, Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969)

393

(grooming not

a fundamental right analogous to marital privacy) ; Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp.
524 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1969).
96 392 F.2d at 703.
97
See, e.g., Leonard v. School Comm., 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965);
Comment, Public Schools, Long Hair, and the Constitution, 55 IowA L. REv. 707,

708 (1970).
98 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
99 Id.at 564.
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on the first amendment supplemented by Griswold's right of privacy
to hold that the state may not regulate what an individual chooses to
view or read in the privacy of his home. The Court found the state
interest in protecting Stanley from self-corruption inferior to his fundamental first amendment "right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home." 1o0 Comparing the state's
argument to an "assertion that the State has the right to control the
moral content of a person's thoughts," 101 the Court invalidated the
Georgia legislation. An Indiana federal district court subsequently
reached a similar result, basing its decision directly on the authority
of Griswold."2 The court stated that prosecution for possession of
obscene material without the intent to sell or distribute violated the
defendant's right to privacy.
In the wake of the Stanley decision, the right to possess and
smoke marijuana in the privacy of one's home has been urged as a
defense to criminal prosecutions under statutes making mere possession
of the drug a crime. Three times this assertion of privacy has been
rejected by the courts. 3 In each case the court determined that no
"right to smoke" exists and that, in the absence of first amendment
considerations, the state's interest in controlling dangerous drugs outweighs any privacy interest presented.
In another controversial field, the Supreme Court of California' 4
and a federal district court sitting in Wisconsin ' have overturned
convictions for violations of state abortion laws when the operation
occurred before the fetus quickened.'
These decisions rest squarely
on the proposition that an individual woman's decision whether to
bear children is a fundamental aspect of that personal and marital
privacy into which the state may not constitutionally intrude. Both
courts cited Griswold as authority for recognizing privacy as a controlling interest in this field.
100 Id. at 565.

i01 Id.
102 Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
The court asserted that
"[w]hile only the right of marital privacy is covered by Cotner and Griswold, it is
clear that this right stems from the greater right to individual privacy." Id. at 67
(emphasis in original). The court further found that the statute had a chilling effect
on the plaintiff's first amendment freedom of inquiry.
103 United States v. Drotar, 416 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1969); Borras v. State, 229
So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, -, 243 N.E.2d 898,
903-04 (1969) (right of privacy explicitly rejected).
104 People v. Belous, - Cal. 2d -, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969)
(en banc), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
10
5 Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
106

Quickening occurs during the fourth month of pregnancy. See id. at 299.
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0 7 an Illinois apIn Keefe v. Organization for a Better Austin,"
pellate court upheld an injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing at a
real estate dealer's home. The pickets sought to publicize certain of
the realtor's undesirable business practices.'0 s Although peaceful picketing and distribution of leaflets is ordinarily considered within the
ambit of the first amendment, the court decided that the dealer's interest
in the privacy of his home and home life merited greater weight. The
court noted a history of decisions prohibiting efforts to bring an individual's business life to his home in this peaceful yet disturbingly effective fashion.' 0 9 Of course, the court permitted the picketing and
leafleting to continue at the dealer's place of business.
An analysis of the cases noted above provides a framework for
judicial decisions accepting or rejecting assertions under Griswold of
a right to privacy. Initially, the interest to be protected must be
categorized as within or without the area of marriage, home, and
family life generally accepted in a free society to constitute the realm
of personal privacy. The more clearly a given interest falls within this
realm, the more compelling must be the governmental interest justifying a particular intrusion or deprivation. In the end, a balance must
be struck between these interests."10
This process is apparent in the cases decided subsequent to
Griswold. The decision whether or not to bear a child is recognized
to be personal and private in the fullest sense, the decision to wear
one's hair long less so. The decision to view obscene material or to
smoke marijuana within the confines of one's home may be classified
as private, but the state's interest in controlling drugs outweighs the
individual's interest in using them. Conversely, the right of an individual to retreat from his business life into the privacy of his home
outweighs even the fundamental first amendment right to picket peacefully. As the balance shifts along this continuum, judicial opinions
manifest in varying degrees unanimity and confidence or conflict and
uncertainty.
107 115 Ill. App.
1os The pickets

2d 236, 253 N.E.2d 76 (1969).
were from a group seeking to prevent real estate dealers in the
Austin area from engaging in the practice of "blockbusting." Keefe and others apparently used the threat of integration to panic white residents into moving out.
109 Although the court did not cite Griswold, its description of the dealer's interest in "privacy and repose" is very much in point. Most important is the weight
given that interest in the face of a conflicting constitutional right, the freedom to
speak. Picketing a home during a labor dispute has generally been considered a
violation of privacy beyond the pale of permissible activity. See Kamin, Residential
Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 177, 198-205 (1966).
11o See Beaney, supra note 20, at 262-65; Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a
Doctrine, 64 Mica. L. REv. 219 (1965). The difference in result betveen this
approach and the one taken in Tames lies in the distinction between prohibiting the
intrusion altogether and permitting it to continue under the ineffective supervision
of an impartial magistrate.
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How does Mrs. James fit into this framework? Her purposes ...
in going to court were to prevent continuing surveillance and questioning about her personal and social life and to regain control over the
management of her home and over raising her children. These objectives clearly pertain to the realm of constitutionally protected personal privacy described only in part by the facts of Griswold." In the
absence of a showing of a compelling state interest for continuing to
deprive public assistance recipients of the ability to attain these objectives, the protection of the constitutional right of privacy should be
extended to them.
In the last five years several courts presented with various assertions of a right of privacy have not shied away from extending Griswold
into new situations when they felt justice would be served thereby.
Although the constitutional right of privacy enunciated in Griswold
remains a shadowy concept difficult to apply, it has not been limited to
the unusual facts of that case. Whether as a distinct constitutional
concept or as part of the reviving doctrine of substantive due process, 113
the right of privacy appears to be taking firmer roots in our scheme of
constitutional order. Recognizing this principle for public assistance
recipients will provide a comprehensible legal guide for reorienting the
administration of the programs to respect and preserve the privacy of
the recipient.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES TO PROTECT PRIVACY

In the absence of judicial enforcement of recipients' right of
privacy, several fundamental changes can be made in the administration
of public assistance programs to protect more adequately the recipients'
interests. Essential to any serious reform is the separation of the
mechanism by which economic grants are made from the mechanism
by which the public assistance agency makes social services available to
its clients. Only by ceasing to tie rehabilitative casework services to
the money grant can they be offered on a truly voluntary basis. A
second important step is to revise the standards for determining eligi111 Although Mrs. James probably did not herself suffer from all of the enumerated difficulties, public assistance recipients as a class have experienced all of
these invasions of privacy. See text accompanying notes 22-34 -upra.
112

See note 102 supra.

113 In his Griswold dissent, Mr. Justice Black inveighed against the revival of
substantive due process because he felt the doctrine permitted judicial decisions based
on the personal whims of a majority of the Justices. 381 U.S. at 511-18. Because
susceptible to subjective definition, the right of privacy also raises the danger of
inconsistent application. But privacy as conceived by Professor Fried can serve
adequately as a guide to principled judicial decisions. Control by an individual over
what is known about himself and over the moral tone of his own home are ideas
generally understood and accepted in this society. The right of privacy is by no
means as undefined as the term "liberty" in the due process clause.
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bility to focus solely on economic aid and to eliminate the morality or
social behavior of the recipient from consideration. These revised
criteria should be susceptible to objective verification to obviate the
need for caseworker surveillance of recipients and their homes. Finally,
the system for verifying information required to determine eligibility
should be altered to minimize the necessity for invading the recipients'
privacy. Legislators and administrators possess the power to effect
these changes; they need not wait for a judicial declaration that the
public assistance recipient has a right to privacy.
A. Separating Economic Grants From Services
Separating the distribution of the economic grant from the provision of services would be a major step toward ending the invasions of
privacy now practiced in the name of social service and rehabilitation." 4
When the recipient knows that as a practical matter she must submit
to the services offered by her caseworker if she and her family are to
eat and keep a roof over their heads, her consent is hardly voluntary.', 5
In effect, the recipient relinquishes control over her children and her
home for the public assistance check she needs to insure the family's
survival. Consequently, the caseworker gains inordinate control over
traditionally private aspects of the family's life.
The practical experience of the social work profession reinforces
the observation that the public assistance recipient should be encouraged
to retain control over her personal affairs. The journals of the profession reveal a consensus that working with the client in his home is
desirable and sometimes essential to success," 6 but the profession also
clearly considers the principle of "client self-determination"-that the
client direct his own life with the help of the caseworker-paramount
117
among its values.
Client self-determination, a relatively new concept, has not always
held this primary position, however. The "friendly visitor" and the
staff member-forerunners of public assistance caseworkers-of the
turn-of-the-century Charity Organization Society considered the ob114

See, e.g., Kahn, Social Services in Relation to Income Security: Introductory
SwicERxv. 381 (1965); McEntire & Haworth, mtpra note 33,

Notes, 39 Soc•
at 22.
115

See note 67 mupra.

116 E.g., Levine, Treatment in the Home, 9 SociAL WORK, Jan. 1964, at 19;

Shames, Use of Homemaker Service in Families That Neglect Their Children, 9
SociAL WORKc, Jan. 1964, at 12; Wiltse, Social Casework Services in the Aid to
Dependent Children Program,28 SociAL SERVICE REV. 173 (1954).
17 See F. BiESTEK, THE CASEWORK RELATi s HIp 103 (1957); G. HAMILTON,
THEORY & PRaCTIcF OF SOCIAL CASE WoRx 6, 4346 (2d ed. 1951); H. PImMaiN,
SociAL CASEWORK 64-83 (1957).
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jects of their charity seriously in need of moral uplift.118 With the
development of the profession, caseworkers began to encourage their
clients to participate in the search for solutions to the problems. Despite this increase in "client participation," the initiative and final
authority remained in the caseworker." 9 As psychological and
psychiatric methods were introduced into social work technique, however, therapy became the keystone requiring that the client willingly
accept treatment. 20 Social workers recognized that their success depended on their ability to involve the client in the therapeutic process.
The principle of client self-determination arose from this evolution, and
the profession currently considers unethical any attempt by a caseworker
to force or trick the client into accepting treatment.
Observance of the ideal of client self-determination, however,
suffers from the observable resistance of many poor clients to the caseworker's efforts to deal with their social problems. Thus new techniques straying from the principle of client self-determination have
been introduced. For instance, caseworkers speak of aggressive casework or "reaching out" casework, each of which aims at involving reluctant clients. 2' The caseworker initially attempts to "win the client
over" to believing that he can be helped, that he can help himself, yet
draws the line short of forcing the observably needy but reluctant client
to accept the offers. Practitioners of this school of thought assume a
less passive role in dealing with unwilling clients, but they universally
recognize that the client must be at least neutral if not actually willing
to cooperate before the social casework process can achieve any degree
of success.m
In addition to allowing caseworkers to operate in a climate more
nearly in accord with their theories, separating social services from
the economic grant will improve the quality of caseworker services.1as
Once the social work function is insulated from the investigative function, caseworkers making home visits will no longer be inhibited by
118 See Becker, Exit Lady Bountiful: The Volunteer and the Professional Social
Worker, 38 SocIAL SEivicE REv. 57 (1964).

119 See Keith-Lucas, A Critique of the Principle of Client Self-determination, 8

SOCIAL WORK, July 1963, at 66.
120 Id.
2 1

1

67; see authorities cited note 117 supra.

See, e.g., Sunley, New Dimensions in Reaching-out Casework, 13

SocIAL

WORK, Apr. 1968, at 64.
122The experience of the social work profession has led its members to conclude
that forcing social services on reluctant recipients is self-defeating. Cf. G. HAMILTON,
supra note 117, at 169-79. Public assistance administrators would do well to heed their
experience.
123 See Blum, Differential Use of Manpower in Public Welfare, 11 SocIAL WoRK,
Jan. 1966, at 16. A more radical suggestion for accomplishing the same end is to
make caseworker services available through private agencies. Recipients could then
hire caseworkers to advocate their interests before the public agency. See Piliavin,
Restructuring the Provision of Social Services, 13 SOCIAL WORK, Jan. 1968, at 34.
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the statutory responsibility to report all evidence of noneligibility' 24
Instead, they will be able to concentrate on providing the assistance and
guidance they were originally intended to provide. Under such conditions, the principle of client self-determination can be implemented
effectively, and the recipient will finally be free to choose whether or
not to cooperate with the caseworker.
As caseworkers are freed to perform the task for which they are
trained, the ability of public assistance agencies to recruit and retain
trained personnel will also increase. 2 The continual reinvestigation
of all assistance cases occupies a major portion of the total available
working time of the caseworker in the public assistance agency. But
the school-trained social worker enters the profession equipped to form
and make effective use of his relationship with the client in attacking
the client's problems. Further, his social work training is a highly
personal experience requiring him to delve extensively into his own
personality so that he will be able to discern his clients' problems and
distinguish them from his own. With this educational background,
the social worker choosing to enter a public agency faces a Hobson's
choice. He may accept a supervisory post or he may become a caseworker destined to spend most of his time performing clerical or investigative tasks. Because of this discouraging experience in the public
agency, many caseworkers quit to work in private agencies or leave the
social work field altogether. 6
B. Revising the Eligibility Criteria
Many of the occasions for the invasions of privacy discussed above
arise as a direct result of eligibility standards susceptible to moralistic
interpretations.2 7 Consequently, critics of the present public assistance
system sometimes despair of accomplishing any significant reform without entirely eliminating the means test. 128 Proponents of negative
income tax plans, for instance, concern themselves primarily with providing income supplements to meet economic need without requiring
124 See text accompanying notes 60-62 ,upra.
125 Cf. Thompson & Riley, Use of Professionals in Public Welfare, 11 SocIAL

Jan. 1966, at 22.
Wopx,
26

3 Id. 23-24.
127 A glaring example is the transformation of the statutory requirement that
one parent be absent before AFDC payments are made, 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (Supp.
IV, 1969), into administrative requirements that the absent parent be interviewed
by the department, see Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public Assistance:
Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
1307 (1967), or that the absent father of an illegitimate child be named before
any payments are made. Doe v. Harder, 310 F. Supp. 302 (D. Conn. 1970) ; Doe v.
Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488, rehearing
denied, 397 U.S. 970 (1970).
128 E.g, Bendich, supra note 22, at 425-34.
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investigation to determine whether the reasons for the need are acceptable." 9 Of course, these proposals possess their own administrative
difficulties involving the possibility of invasions of privacy similar to
those presently occurring in public assistance. 18 0
To reduce the potential for abuse, all eligibility criteria pertaining
to the behavior of the recipient and not objectively verifiable should be
eliminated. The criteria should be limited to the following economic
considerations: (1) Income from employment, pensions, or other
government programs must be less than a certain amount; and (2) the
applicant must have less than a stipulated amount of other assets within
her personal control from which support could be derived. Furthermore, once the department establishes that the applicant is eligible, it
should then determine the amount of assistance the recipient receives
solely from her financial situation. A standard of living can be established for a given area by observing the cost of food, clothing, shelter,
and other necessities. After measuring the recipient's financial status
against this standard, the proper amount of the grant remains a clerical
judgment.
But a public assistance agency has a legitimate interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its program by seeking to prevent fraud.
How should it police the suggested economic criteria? Statements
volunteered by the applicant at the time of application will serve adequately as a starting point for an initial eligibility determination.''.
Whenever the information provided by the applicant at this stage appears invalid, verification may be accomplished in an objective manner
without intruding upon the applicant's privacy. Information supplied
by the applicant with reference to the number of children in the family
and the amount of family expenses can be verified simply by having a
clerk read birth certificates and receipts, if available, for such major
items as rent, utilities, clothing, and food.
Ascertaining the applicant's exact income presents a more difficult
problem. Yet a recipient's attempt to conceal substantial income from
employment could probably be uncovered by examining social security
records because employers are required by law to deduct social security
payments from wages. The source of any regular pension income could
likewise be verified by checking records available from other governmental sources. One source of income from employment not susceptible
to easy verification would be cash received for casual labor. Assuming
129 Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77
YAr.L L.J. 1, 2 (1967).
130 See Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax, 78 YALE L.J. 388,
393, 406-09 (1969) ; Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute, 78 YALE LJ.
269, 279, 286 (1968).
181 See

text accompanying notes 134-48 infra.
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that this work would be irregular, the cost of policing this source would
probably exceed the amounts recovered or saved. If, however, a particular case gave rise to extraordinary suspicions of fraud, a warrant
for a home inspection could be obtained, permitting an investigator to
observe any signs of concealed assets in the home and to pursue purely
financial questions.
Another potential source of support difficult for the caseworker to
verify would be gifts from relatives or from men associating with the
AFDC mother within or without the home. Any program attempting
to establish the amounts received from these sources would be costly,
time-consuming, and would obviously intrude upon the recipient's-and
the donor's-privacy. Limiting the outside asset criterion to sources
of support within the personal control of the applicant minimizes these
costs and the intrusions resulting from attempts to verify the presence
or absence of such assets.13 2 If the applicant wished to declare it, voluntary support from family or friends might be included in the recipient's income, but efforts by the public assistance agency to coerce
relatives into supporting their kin should be eliminated. These relatives already pay taxes if they are able to contribute to the support of
the applicant, and should be considered to have discharged their
1 33
obligations.
Whether the means test is revised or eliminated, the goal should
be to rid subsistence level income maintenance programs of all dependency on the moral judgments of the administrators dispensing the
funds. The fiscal integrity of the program can be maintained by inquiries directed exclusively to those financial transactions revealed by
public records. In a society claiming to respect liberty and the dignity
of the individual, the government should not trade income maintenance
payments for control over the private lives of the recipients.
C. Objective Verification: The New HEW Regulations
Following the completion of successful tests of a new system for
determining eligibility,' 34 the Department of Health, Education, and
132Negative income tax proposals have also intentionally excluded, to varying
degrees, these potential sources of support from the recipient's income because of the
cost of enforcement and the effect on recipient privacy. See, e.g., Popkin, supra note
130, at 393-94 (relatives' gifts should be excluded) ; Comment, mtpra note 130, at 279.
133 See Bell, supra note 29. Of course, to the extent that the man in the house
or the relative bears a legal support duty, this statement would not apply. The
resources would then be within the recipient's control.
134
See Hoshino, Siniplification of the M1feans Test and Its Consequences, 41
SocrA.L SERvIcE REv. 237, 241-45 (1967), reporting successful state-initiated tests in
Alabama, California, Colorado, Maine, and West Virginia. Hoshino concludes on
the basis of these tests that:
[T]here appears to be little question of the feasibility of simplifying the
method of determining eligibility for assistance in the adult categories by

1214

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.118:1188

Welfare recently promulgated a regulation requiring the states to
implement an essentially declaratory system labelled the "simplified
method." "" The purposes of the new system as summarized in the
text of the regulation include giving "full respect for the rights and
dignity of applicants for, and recipients of assistance." '36 The regulations now require progressive implementation of the simplified method
in all categories except AFDC during fiscal year 1970-71. Implementation of the new system in the AFDC program, originally scheduled for
April 1, 1970, has been postponed indefinitely pending the results of
Eventually, however, all eligibility deterfurther experimentation."'
minations will be made according to the method described in the HEW
regulation.
The regulation defines the simplified method as
an organized method by which the agency accepts the statements of the applicant for, or recipient of assistance, about
facts that are within his knowledge and competence . . . as
a basis for decisions regarding his eligibility and extent of
entitlement.'3 8
The public assistance agency can seek additional information whenever
the statements volunteered by the applicant are "incomplete, unclear, or
inconsistent, or where other circumstances . . . indicate to a prudent
person that further inquiry should be made, and the individual cannot
clarify the situation." 19 The method contemplates that quality control
will be accomplished by fully investigating a significant sampling of the
caseload. The remainder of the recipients will escape intensive investigation unless the sampling process reveals that more than three percent
of the eligibility decisions are erroneous. If the three percent tolerance
level established by the regulation is exceeded with regard to any
eligibility factor, such as the number of children in the household, then
the state will temporarily be compelled to verify all the decisions involving that factor. 4 ° The regulation offers no guidance concerning
the method for accomplishing this intensive verification,14 ' but the
using declarations and mailed questionnaires. The basic problems are the
complexities of the eligibility policies themselves and the ingrained habits
and attitudes of some staff members. .

.

. [T]here appear to be no serious

contraindications to extending the simplified methods to all adult categories
in all states.
Id. 245. The tests involved mostly Old Age Assistance recipients.
135 45 C.F.R. § 205.20 (1970).
136 Id.
137 35 Fed. Reg. 8366 (1970).
138 45 C.F.R. § 205.20(c) (1970).

139
Id. § 20520(a) (3) (emphasis added).
140 Id. § 205.20(c) (5) (iii).
141 However, "[t]he system contemplates periodic review and monitoring of operations by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare." Id.
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public assistance agency will presumably be free to resume its traditional methods of investigation when ordered to conduct full-scale
verifications.
To the extent that the simplified method will limit the practice of
exhaustive investigations of all applicants and recipients, its introduction will add to their privacy. Difficulties will continue to arise, however, for the occasional unfortunate recipient who finds herself the
object of an intensive verification investigation.142 Only a pious statement of intent in the regulation limits the scope of the verifier's discretion. If the criteria for the eligibility decision were limited to
economic data subject to objective verification, the kind of spot checking or corrective action contemplated by this regulation might permit
the recipient to retain a measure of privacy. The present criteria,
however, include the personal and moral issues used by public assistance
agencies to justify the inquiries against which Mrs. James asserted her
right of privacy. Simplifying the administration of the criteria by
placing the program on a declaration basis will not greatly improve the
situation unless the eligibility criteria are likewise revised.
An experiment underway in four New Jersey cities and one Pennsylvania city evidences the feasibility of the revised administrative
system outlined in this section.143 The primary purpose of this experiment, funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, is to measure the
"work incentive" effect of varying levels of guaranteed income payments. The monthly payments guaranteed under the three-year program decrease if the recipient's earned income increases, but the scale
assures the recipient that he will always benefit (receive more total
The method of administering the project,
income) by working.1 '
however, differs markedly from current methods of administering
public assistance and closely resembles the administration of the federal
income tax. Once a month the recipient family must report its income,
enclosing all pay check stubs, and any change in family composition.14
Less frequently, an audit is conducted using a random sample comprising ten percent of the families. The information requested for the
audit includes unemployment benefits, Social Security Account records,
federal withholding tax forms (W-2), and a statement of cash expendi142Because a number of erroneous determinations will result simply from
bureaucratic confusion, one may anticipate a sizable number of 100% verifications,
all at the expense of the taxpayer and the recipient's privacy.
43
Feb. 28,
' See Can Handouts Make Better Wage Earners?, BusINEss WEE,
1970, at 80.
144 Office of Economic Opportunity, Preliminary Results of the New Jersey
Graduated Work Incentive Experiment 25, Feb. 18, 1970.
5
14 See Watts, Adjusted and Extended Preliminary Results from the Urban
Graduated Work Incentive Experiment 6, June 10, 1970 (discussion paper, Institute
for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wis.).
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tures for the year patterned after the Internal Revenue Service annual
personal expenditure form. 146 Participants are encouraged to obtain
the first three items of information by requesting duplicate forms from
the respective federal administrative agencies.
The initial conclusions drawn from the experiment after one year
of operation indicate that administrative costs will be at least fifty
percent below the normal level among public assistance agencies,1 1 7 and
that eighty to ninety percent of the families can be expected to fill out
and file correctly all the forms without extensive assistance from the
project's staff.' 4
Furthermore, the experiment appears acceptable to
the participants specifically because the concrete income analysis allows
them to demonstrate need without the humiliation inherent in the
present means test treatment.' 49 Because it treats recipients in much
the same manner as the federal income tax system treats wealthier
citizens, this project offers hope for an improved method of administering public assistance incorporating the suggestions embodied in this
section of the Article.
CONCLUSION
. her face
What is welfare? I asked my teacher..
got very hard. She looked at me the way I look at the cockroaches crawling over the old people on 104th Street ...
Is welfare something you are born into, like the serfs were
born into being serfs in the middle ages? Are you born into
this world into what you are and stay as you are? .

I think welfare is bad. But I don't understand why it
should be bad. Is welfare a punishment? Is Momma being
punished for what she did when she was a girl almost as
old as I am now? 10
146 Letter from Mrs. Jerilyn Fair, Admin. Assist., Council for Grants to Families
to the author, Feb. 24, 1970, on file at the Biddle Law Library of the University
of Pennsylvania.
'47 The OEO report states that:
The estimated total cost per family for this type of administration is $72
to $96 per year, exclusive of work training and day care costs. This figure
compares to the estimated cost of $200 to $300 per family per year for the
existing welfare system, also excluding the costs of training and services.
Preliminary Results, supra note 144, at 23.
14S BusINEss WEEK, supra note 143, at 82, attributes this finding to John 0.
Wilson, Assist. Dir., OEO. As a result of the success in New Jersey, new projects
are being started in Iowa and North Carolina. Id.
149 See Shore, A Preliminary Report: Recipient Reaction to the Negative Income
Tax Experiment 17-19, Aug. 30, 1970 (paper prepared for Mathematica, Inc., Princeton, N.J.).
150 J. HORWITZ, THE DIARY OF A.N.: THE STORY OF THE HOUSE ON WEST 104TH
STREET 14-15 (1970).
A.N. is fictitious, but her pitiful existence on West 104th
Street in New York City is a composite drawn from Mr. Horwitz's eight years of
experience as a New York welfare caseworker.
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This is public assistance seen through the eyes of a girl whose mother
is on AFDC. Few have the spirit to say, as she did:
I will run from this failure. I will outrun it for all the
days of my life. It will never be faster than me. I will be
swifter than it and always keep it at my back. It will never
get ahead of me. I don't know what I will be running
toward but I do know that I will be running from failure,
and I will see West 104th Street as a life that is not worthy
of existence." 5'
Contending for privacy for a family able to afford only a single
room in which to live may seem odd. But without the privacy needed
to develop mature human relationships, only the rare few will have the
spirit to run fast enough to escape from the imprisoning ghetto into
worlds of their own.
151Id. 219.

